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Abstract
Safety stock planning with focus on risk protection to cope with demand uncertainties is a 
very well researched topic in the field of supply chain management, in central as well as in 
local decision making systems. In contrast, there is only few knowledge about safety stock 
management in situations where supply risks have to be covered that are caused by 
uncertainties with respect to production yields. In this study, a two-stage manufacturer-retailer 
supply chain is considered in a single-period context that allows for an analytical study of the 
impact of yield randomness on safety stock determination. In order to concentrate the analysis 
on the effects of yield uncertainty demand will be assumed to be deterministic.  
We consider three basic types of yield randomness which represent different reasons for yield 
losses in production processes each, namely the stochastically proportional, binomial, and 
interrupted geometric yield type. It will be shown that these different yield risk specifications 
can bring about completely different properties with regard to the way safety stocks depend 
on various input parameters in supply chain planning.
This holds especially for the impact of the demand size and for the influence of the level of 
product profitability in a supply chain. In an analytical model-based investigation it is 
demonstrated that these safety stock properties not only differ between the respective yield 
types, but also between systems of central and decentralized supply chain decision making. 
Thus, this study presents general insights into the importance of a correct yield type 
specification for an effective safety stock management and explains necessary differences in 
the stock distribution across supply chain stages in both centralized and decentralized settings.  
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1. Safety Stocks in Supply Chains 
Safety stocks are held in supply chains in order to provide an economically reasonable service 
of delivery for end customers if various types of risks may disrupt the flow of products. These 
risks can result from lacking predictability of external demand, from unreliability of 
production and transportation processes, or from service deficiencies of outside suppliers. 
Safety stocks are established at different stages of a supply chain by production or 
procurement decisions that result in planned inflow of products at certain stocking points 
which differ from the expected outflow. Thus, in a periodic planning environment a safety 
stock at some stock point can be generally defined as expected net stock at the end of a 
decision period (see Silver/Pyke/Peterson, p.234) that results from respective operational 
decisions.
In literature there is a vast amount of contributions that deal with supply chain safety stock 
planning aiming to cope with demand uncertainties (see Graves and Willems 2003 and 
Axsäter 2003). The impact of supplier unreliability on safety stocks is also an issue that is 
widely addressed in scientific contributions, usually jointly with the supplier selection 
problem (see Minner 2003 and Burke et al. 2009). Compared to that, a fairly limited number 
of contributions is devoted to the problem of safety stock determination in case of production 
yield risks in a supply chain setting (see Li et al. 2012 and Inderfurth and Vogelgesang 2013).  
Different from other risk environments, the specific problem concerning decision making 
under random yields is that in such a situation the procurement decision has an impact on the 
risk level. The basic context is illustrated in Figure 1 where in a simple supply chain context 
the decision variable is the input Q at a production stage which procured from an external 
supplier and is randomly transformed into a production output Y(Q) that is used as final 
product to fulfill some end customer demand D. In a centralized setting the decisions on 
manufacturing and sales  are directly connected. In the case of a decentralized supply chain 
manufacturer and retailer are independent decision makers, and the retailer transforms the 
customer demand into an upstream order that constitutes the producer’s demand. Outside 
supplier and end customer are supply chain external actors. 
Figure 1: The basic random yield setting 
Since under regular process conditions the output quantity cannot exceed the input level, the 
so-called yield rate Z(Q)= Y(Q)/Q is always a fraction between zero and one. According to 
different reasons for yield uncertainty there exist different types of yield randomness which 
are characterized by differences in the way the stochastic yield rate depends on the production 
level (see Yano and Lee 1995). In this paper it will be shown that it is critically important to 
identify the correct yield type in practical cases because different yield characteristics will 
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cause different structural results for production and safety stock management. This holds for 
both a centrally and a locally managed supply chain.  
In order to concentrate this study on the pure impact of yield randomness on safety stock 
decisions and to facilitate analytical results two major restrictions are imposed. First, only 
risks from the side of production yields are considered and data concerning external 
customers’ demand and external suppliers’ delivery processes are assumed to be 
deterministic. Second, only a single-period context is addressed so that it is possible to model 
and analyze decision making also for a decentralized supply chain with independent actors in 
a general way. The respective problem type has already been investigated for a limited range 
of yield models (see e.g. Keren 2009 and Li et al. 2013). By concentrating on this type of 
model, we will consider a counterpart of the well-known newsvendor model with 
deterministic yield and random demand  which is very well researched (see Khouja 1999 and 
Qin et al. 2011) including its extensions to decentralized supply chain settings (see Cachon 
2003). From the newsvendor context under the objective of maximizing the expected profit it 
is well-known that the optimal procurement quantity is a critical fractile of the demand 
distribution. This critical ratio is high for high-margin products and low for low-margin ones. 
From the respective analysis it is also known that the optimal procurement level might be 
lower than expected demand in cases of low product profitability so that the safety stock 
becomes negative. Additionally, newsvendor research has revealed that in a decentralized 
supply chain under a simple wholesale price contract procurement level and safety stock will 
always be below the respective value in the centralized case where the supply chain is 
managed by a single decision maker. This results from the so-called double marginalization 
effect (see Spengler 1950) that is usually observed in a simple wholesale price contract 
setting.
In the sequel, it will be investigated to which extent the newsvendor results carry over to a 
corresponding random yield model, and which role the specific yield type will play in this 
context. To this end the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, before optimization 
procedures for centralized and decentralized decision making are explained, the three 
commonly used types of yield randomness are introduced and modeled, namely the 
stochastically proportional, the binomial, and interrupted geometric yield process. Next, for 
each yield type a specific section (Sections 3 to 5) is dedicated in order to analyze safety stock 
determination under centralized and decentralized supply chain management and reveal 
specific properties for different yield situations. Finally, Section 6 concludes this study by 
focusing on relevant insights and addressing open research questions. 
2. Supply Chains with Random Yields 
2.1.     Yield Types and Safety Stocks
There exist various reasons for randomness in the outcome of a production process. In some 
cases a complete production batch Q is exposed specific uncertain processing conditions (like 
weather conditions in agricultural production) so that there is perfect correlation of 
defectiveness of units within a lot. This situation is described by a so-called stochastically 
proportional (SP) yield model, formulated as  
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    	            (1) 
with a random yield rate Z that is characterized by a 
	  and 	  with given mean  and variance .
The yield situation is completely different if single defective units are generated because of 
independent quality problems concerning single input materials or single manufacturing 
operations. In this case there is no correlation of defectiveness, and the total number of non-
defective units in a lot Q follows a binomial (BI) distribution. With a success probability  for 
each unit, in this BI yield case the probabilities of yield size 	 	 are given 
by
!"#  $%  &'()  (  * + ',(		-"		$  	./ 0 /  .                   (2) 
Under BI yield the parameters of the yield rate Z are expressed as 
    and   12,1'   .                                                 (3) 
A third yield model applies if production is affected by a risk which results in a move of the 
manufacturing process from an in-control to an out-of-control state, meaning that all produced 
units are good before this move while they are all defective afterwards. If the probability of 
staying in-control is denoted by  for any item, the yield 	within a batch follows a so-
called interrupted geometric (IG) distribution, characterized by 
!"#  $%  3(  * + 		-"		$  ./*/ 0 /  + *	'												-"															$  		
(4)
In this IG yield case the following formulas hold for the yield rate parameters (see Inderfurth 
and Vogelgesang (2013)) 
  12,142,1'     and   1&2,15674),2,128'15642,17'7   .        (5)
Obviously, IG yield is characterized by some positive level of yield correlation within a 
production lot.
The three types of yield randomness described above are the basic ones that are widely used 
to model uncertainty in the output of production processes (see Yano and Lee 1995). For 
decision making it is critically important to consider which yield type is relevant in a specific 
case. This is because these basic yield models differ in the way the yield rate parameters are 
affected by the production input quantity Q. While  and  do not depend on the level of 
production under SP yield, things are very much different for the other yield types. Under BI
yield the yield rate variance decrease with increasing production, and under IG yield 
additionally the mean of the yield rate becomes the smaller the larger the level of production 
will be. These effects that are visualized in Figure 2 for a specific data set lead to qualitatively 
different conditions for optimal decision making concerning the size of production and safety 
stocks.
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Figure 2: Yield rate parameters and batch size for 9!    .:	;	9!  .*<
2.2. Optimization in Centralized and Decentralized Supply Chains  
According to its definition as expected net stock at the end of a decision period, in a single-
period context with firm demand the safety stock is directly determined by the choice of the 
production level. In the current analysis risk-neutral decision makers are assumed, and the 
optimal decisions are defined as those which maximize the expected profit. This optimization, 
however, proceeds quite different for centralized and decentralized supply chains.  
Centralized Supply Chain 
In a centralized supply chain production and retailing is in one hand, and the decision is how 
to determine the production input Q so that the total expected supply chain profit =>?	under
random production yield Y(Q) and deterministic customer demand D is maximized . The 
respective profit function can be formulated as 
=>?  
  @#ABC/ D% +   .                    (6) 
Here, p stands for the retail price and c for the (input) cost per unit. Without loss of generality, 
it will be assumed in the following analysis that any excess stock after production has a zero 
salvage value. The optimal production decision Q* results in a safety stock level SSTC for the 
centralized case amounting to 
99E?  @#F% + D.         (7) 
For the centralized supply chain the expected physical inventory (on-hand) IOHC at the 
period’s end is given as 
GHI?  @#FJF K D%         (8) 
and, thus, cannot exceed the safety stock. 
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Decentralized Supply Chain 
Under decentralization of decision making, the producer and the retailer will maximize their 
local profits each. In this case the retailer first decides on his order quantity DR released to the 
manufacturer, and the producer determines her production input QP in reaction to this supply 
chain internal demand. Different from a standard newsvendor situation, in the case of random 
yield both supply chain actors bear a risk, namely a production risk at the manufacturer’s 
stage and a supply risk at the retailer’s stage. So the retailer needs to have some information 
about the manufacturer’s yield process and resulting delivery performance in order to form 
some expectation on how the manufacturer will react on his order decision. To avoid some 
arbitrary estimation (like ‘the manufacturer always inflates an order by the reciprocal of the 
mean yield rate’) it is assumed that for the retailer the state of information is such that he can 
completely retrace the producer’s optimization procedure. Thus, the interplay of decisions can 
be formulated as a Stackelberg game, meaning that the retailer will anticipate the producer’s 
reaction when determining his order level. The interaction within the supply chain is assumed 
to be characterized by a simple wholesale price contract so that the retailer has to pay a 
respective (internal) price w for each unit he receives from the manufacturer. Because of the 
production yield uncertainty the manufacturer’s output might exceed the retailer’s order. In 
this case the producer only delivers the order quantity DR and excess production is lost. Under 
these circumstances the producer’s profit function equals 
=LLJDM  N  @#ABCL/ DM% +   L .        (9) 
Maximizing this profit leads to an optimal conditional decision LDM. Under consideration 
of this decision the retailer maximizes his own profit =MDMJL which is given by  =MDMJL  
  @#ABCL/ DM/ D% + N  @#ABCL/ DM%   (10) 
and will result in an optimal order decision DML. After respective inserting operations the 
effective optimal decisions DMF  DMLDM and LF  LDMF of both actors can be 
determined. 
In a decentralized setting the global supply chain safety stock depends only on the producer’s 
production output since under normal price conditions N O 
 the retailer will never order 
below the (deterministic) demand level. So this safety stock SSTD is given by 
99EP  @#LF% + D.       (11) 
A split of this overall safety stock to the producer and retailer side can only be carried out 
arbitrarily and, thus, will be left . This, however, is different for the expected stock on-hand 
which can be separated into a producer’s share given by 
GHILP  @#LFJLF K DMF%      (12) 
and a retailer’s share which is calculated as 
GHIMP  @#LFJDMF Q LF K D%.      (13) 
Price and cost parameters must meet some economic conditions in order to guarantee that the 
supply chain actors are able to make profits that are positive or at least zero. So it is assumed 
that R O N O 
 In this context, it has to be noted that due to the specific dependency 
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 for IG yield the lower bound for w and p will depend on the choice of the production 
level. *R can also be interpreted as minimum level of the product profitability defined by 
w/c for the manufacturer and p/c for the entire supply chain.
Yield Types and Safety Stock Properties 
In order to find how different yield types affect the sign and level of safety stocks under 
centralized and decentralized decision making, the above optimization approaches have to be 
carried out for the different yield types (SP,BI,IG) and their respective modeling of the 
random variable Y(Q). Before this will be investigated in detail in the forthcoming sections, 
some general results are presented which directly can be derived from the characteristics of 
the yield models. These results hold for both centralized and decentralized supply chains.  
Property (1): If the production level Q does not exceed the demand size D (i.e., for  O D),
the supply chain safety stock is always negative (SST<0) for each yield type.  
This is simply because in all yield models @#% S D holds due to  O .
Property (2): In the case of IG yield the safety stock is always negative (SST<0), independent 
of yield and price/cost parameters.  
This property is a result of the specific probability distribution of yields in (4). The 
probabilities of IG yields with a value smaller than or equal to demand D do not change if the 
production level is increased above D, i.e. !"#  $% is independent of Q for $ O D and 
Q>D. This means that the revenues in the profit functions (6) and (9) cannot be increased by 
increasing the production level above demand. So always  O D will be chosen for economic 
reasons, and Property (1) directly applies in this case. 
The detailed analysis of yield type effects on safety stock characteristics is facilitated if all 
variables can be treated as continuous. To this end, in the sequel we assume that for SP yield  
the yield rate Z is continuous and approximate the yield Y(Q) in the BI yield case by a normal 
random variable with parameters from (3) (exploiting the De Moivre-Laplace theorem).  
Finally, under IG yield the respective yield expectation in (5) is treated as a continuous 
function in Q.
3. Safety Stocks under SP Yield 
With pdf T for the yield rate in the case of SP yield, the expected sales volume in (6) and 
(9) can be expressed as
@#ABC/ D%  U T    T  T VPR'W U D  T  T2PR' .    (14) 
Exploiting this formulation, the profit maximization problem in the centralized and 
decentralized supply chain setting can be solved analytically as shown in Inderfurth and 
Clemens (2014). Thus, the respective production and ordering decisions can be analyzed with 
respect to their impact on safety stock holding, and general interrelationships can be detected. 
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3.1.     Centralized Supply Chain 
Maximizing the profit in (6) under the SP specific sales formula in (14) results in an optimal 
production quantity
F  XF  D   with XF K *         (15) 
where XFis implicitly given by  	U T  T  T  YZ2 [F\W  .                  (16) 
From (15) it is evident that the optimal production quantity is always larger than demand with 
a demand inflation factor XF that is constant. From (16) it follows that this inflation factor 
increases with increasing product profitability level p/c.
With F from (15), according to (7) the safety stock in the centralized supply chain is given 
by
99E?    F + D    XF + *  D .                             (17) 
Together with the  XF formulation in (16) this means that a positive safety stock will always 
be employed if the product profitability is sufficiently high and exceeds some critical level ]
which is calculated from   XF  *, resulting in
               ]  ^U T  T  T_`W a,2.                                 (18) 
With increasing profitability it is obvious that the supply chain safety stock will also increase. 
The expected on-hand inventory is given by 
GHI?  		 U XF  T + *  D  T  T22 [F\                              (19) 
and obviously will increase with growing product margin. 
3.2.     Decentralized Supply Chain  
The manufacturer’s optimization problem, i.e. maximization of profit =LLJDM in (9), 
equals that in the centralized problem except that external demand D is replaced by the 
retailer’s order DR and the sales price p by the wholesale price w. Accordingly, the buyer’s 
optimal production is given by 
LDM  XL  DM   with XL K *                   (20) 
where XL is defined by
U T  T  T  Yb2 [c\W  .       (21) 
From w<p it is obvious that the producer’s inflation factor is smaller than the respective 
factor under centralized optimization, i.e. XL S XF.
Anticipating the producer’s reaction in (20), the retailer maximizes his profit =MDMJL in 
(10) by ordering an amount that is equal to or above demand D according to  
9
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DMF  3D											 			XM O XLD  [d[c	 		 			XM Q XL  ,     (22) 
where the factor KR is determined from   
U T  T  T  YZ V bZ  2,e[c[c2R[dW        (23) 
so that also for KR the relationship XM S XF holds. 
Given the retailer’s ordering decision in (22), the supply chain interaction from (20) results in 
a manufacturer’s production level that is characterized by 
LF  fXL  D		 		XM O XL	XM  D		 		XM Q XL  .                  (24) 
Thus, also in a decentralized supply chain the effective production input is always 
proportional to the demand level, but with an inflation factor which is smaller than under 
centralized decision making. The system-wide safety stock SSTD from (11) is calculated 
analogously to (17) and, due to LF S F, must be smaller than in the centralized supply chain. 
The production and safety stock level in the decentralized supply chain very much depends on 
the level of the wholesale price w within the feasible range   O N O 
g . From the 
definition of KP in (21) it follows that KP is increasing in w with XL  * for N   g  and XL  XF for N  
 The KR definition in (23) reveals that KR is decreasing in w with XM  XF
for N   g  so that there exists some wholesale price w (to be determined from equalizing 
the right-hand sides of equations (21) and (23)) for which both inflation factors KP and KR are 
equal. Given these interrelationships, the interplay of retailer and manufacturer decision in 
(22) and (24) leads to a producer’s decision on production and safety stock level which is 
equal to the centralized solution (i.e. LF  F	hC	99EP  99E?	) for the extreme w values N   g  and N  
. In between these limits, the retailer’s order is decreasing with 
increasing w and stays constant at demand level D after KR reaches the KP value, while the 
manufacturer’s production input will first decrease and then increase again. This relationship 
is visualized in the following Table 1 where the results for a numerical example are presented. 
This example is characterized by the following data:   */ 
  *i/ D  *.. and Z is 
uniformly distributed in [0,1] so that   .j holds. 
W 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
SP QP 265 220 196 180 173 187 200 212 224 235 245 255 265
Yield DR 265 179 138 114 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Z~U[0,1] SST 32 10 2 10 13 6 0 6 12 17 22 27 32
μZ=0.5 IOHP 0 4 9 12 15 20 25 30 34 39 43 47 51
IOHR 51 29 14 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 1: Decisions and stocks in a decentralized supply chain for SP yield 
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 In Table 1 also the values for the safety stock 99EP and the expected on-hand inventories are 
reported. The safety stock directly follows the manufacturer’s production decision and thus 
reaches its highest values for the lower and the upper limiting wholesale price level where it 
just equals the stock under centralization. Starting with the lowest w level, with increasing 
wholesale price the safety stock will always decrease first and will increase again after 
reaching a minimum value at some intermediate price level. Naturally, the total on-hand 
inventory in the supply chain follows the trend of the safety stock, but at some higher level. It 
is interesting, however, that the IOH distribution is very different for low and for high 
wholesale price values. This is specifically distinct in the extreme cases. For the lowest w
level the on-hand inventory is completely held by the retailer because the manufacturer’s 
production quantity coincides with the retailer’s order size. At the highest w level the 
complete physical inventory is on the producer’s side as the retailer’s order does not exceed 
the external demand. With increasing wholesale price the inventory on hand is continuously 
increasing for the producer and continuously decreasing for the retailer reaching zero at the 
retail stage of the supply chain as soon as the retailer’s order falls to demand level.  
4. Safety Stocks under BI Yield 
As mentioned in Section 2, for the BI yield analysis it will be assumed that the binomial 
distribution of yields can be properly approximated by a normal distribution. Based on this 
approximation, profit maximization in the centralized and decentralized supply chain can be 
conducted by means of mathematical calculus. The respective analysis is performed in 
Clemens and Inderfurth (2014) with results that will be exploited here for safety stock 
analysis in the following subsections.
Under the normality assumption in the case of BI yield, the expected sales volume in (6) and 
(9) can be expressed by
@#ABC/ D%  U k  'k  k VPW U D  'k  k'P       (25) 
where 'k denotes the density function of a Normal distribution with parameters that – 
according to (3) – depend on the production level Q, i.e. 
		l'    			;			l'  m  * +    .     (26) 
A comparison with the corresponding expression for SP yield in (14) shows that the expected 
sales do not depend on the D/Q ratio in the same simple way, because production level Q has 
an impact on the yield variability.  
4.1.     Centralized Supply Chain 
When the supply chain profit in (6) is maximized under the sales formula for BI yield in (25) 
the optimal production quantity F	is given as implicit solution from  
nD/ F  YZ .       (27) 
Here, nD/  is defined as 
11
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nD/  o 1  pq  r>&TP/') + st4_t4  >&TP/')u     (28) 
where r>  and >  stand for cdf and pdf of the standard normal distribution and TP/' is the 
standardized variable 
TP/' o P,_t4st4   .       (29) 
From the properties of the nD/  function it can be shown that the optimal production 
quantity F	, and thus the respective safety stock level 99E?, will increase with increasing 
product profitability p/c. Different from the SP yield case, however, production level F	 is no 
longer proportional to customer demand D and tends to the value D   D gg  as the demand 
becomes larger and larger. This property is caused by the fact that under BI yield the yield 
rate variability is affected by the production quantity and that this variability – according to 
(3) – is approaching zero if the demand-triggered production volume becomes very large. 
This risk reduction is due to the missing correlation of defects within a production lot which, 
different from the SP situation, creates a risk-pooling effect. 
With respect to the safety stock level 99E?    F	 + D from (7) this means that this stock 
tends to zero when demand D moves to a very high level. In general, the safety stock might be 
positive or negative depending on the product profitability level p/c. The critical p/c ratio ]
can be calculated from equation (27) by fixing   D g  or TP/'  ., respectively. This 
critical level amounts to 
]  ^  &.j + .qm* +  Dg )a,2                                          (30) 
so that, different from the SP yield situation in (18), the sign of the safety stock also depends 
on the demand level. According to (8) the expected stock on hand GHI? will always be 
somewhat larger than the safety stock level.    
4.2. Decentralized Supply Chain 
Like in the analysis for SP yield the producer’s optimal decision corresponds to the optimal 
production decision in the centralized system given that demand and price are represented by 
the local data DR and w. Thus the manufacturer’s response function LDM	 is implicitly 
defined from 
      		n&DM/L)  Yb                   (31)  
with the same properties as described for centralized decision making.  
The retailer’s reaction when maximizing his profit =MDMJL from (10) is gained from the 
solution of the following equation 
+N  ^* + r>&TPd/'c)a V v
  nL/ D + N  nL/ DMw  x'cPdxPd  .    (32) 
as long as the respective DM value is larger than demand D. Otherwise DMF  D is optimal. 
When exploiting the retailer-producer interaction in (31) the producer’s optimal decision LF ,
unfortunately, cannot be expressed in a closed-form manner. From nD/ F S nDMF/ LF
12
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for N S 
, however, it follows that LF S F so that also the supply chain safety stock 99EP
in a decentralized supply chain will not exceed the respective stock level in a centralized 
system. It also can be shown that for the lower and upper wholesale price bound within the 
feasible range of w the manufacturer’s optimal production level is equal to the optimal 
quantity in the centralized supply chain, i.e. LF  F. For N  
 this results from (31) 
because the retailer’s response equals external demand (DMF  D) in this case. For N   g  *R it can be derived from (32) that the retailer will order DMF  F and the 
manufacturer will choose her production level according to this order. The course of orders 
and production quantities for changing w values within the feasible range resembles that in 
the SP yield case. With increasing wholesale price w the retailer’s order DMF  is decreasing and 
reaches the size of external demand at some critical price, while the production quantity LF  is 
first decreasing, but increasing again after it reaches some minimum level. This is also 
illustrated by a numerical example in Table 2 where the same data are used as in the SP yield 
example in Table 1 except for the yield description. For BI yield here a success probability of   .j is chosen which equals the  value in the SP yield case.
 w 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
 QP 215 211 207 205 205 207 209 210 211 212 213 214 215
BI DR 215 109 104 101 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yield SST 8 6 4 3 3 4 5 5 6 6 7 7 8
=0.5 IOHP 0 2 3 4 4 5 6 6 6 7 7 8 8
 IOHR 8 4 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Table 2: Decisions and stocks in a decentralized supply chain for BI yield 
The values of safety stock 99EP and stock on hand IOH held by the producer and retailer that 
are reported in Table 2 follow directly from the production and order decisions. A comparison with
Table 1 shows that the dependency of these stock values on the wholesale price w has the 
same structure as under SP yield. While the BI levels are considerably lower their course is 
much smoother. This effect stems from the property of BI yield that, different from SP yield, 
the risk from the random yield rate (in terms of its variance) is decreasing with increasing 
order and production level. 
From the previous analysis it is apparent that both yield types, SP and BI, have an impact on 
safety stock management in centralized and decentralized supply chains which is different in 
terms of stock levels, but results in the same qualitative structure concerning the influence of 
prices on stocks.
5. Safety Stocks under IG Yield 
From Property 2 we know that in case if IG yield the production level will never exceed the 
respective demand (i.e.  O D) so that the expected sales quantity in (6) and (9) will reduce to  
@#ABC/ D%  @#%  12,142,1  .    (33) 
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From this sales function it follows that the respective profit functions which have to be 
optimized do not depend on the demand level, except for the condition that  O D holds. As 
mentioned in subsection 2.2., under IG yield the lower bound R for w and p depends 
on the batch size Q. Since  in (5) is montonously decreasing in Q, the minimum value 
of this bound is given for Q=1 and amounts to R.
 5.1.     Centralized Supply Chain 
Using the result in (33), the profit function from (6) can be expressed as  
=>?  
  12,1  * + ' +    .      (34) 
It is easy to show that =>? is a concave function so that the optimal production level can 
by determined by exploiting the first-order optimality condition 
    
xyz{'x'  +
  12,1    ' +   . . 
This results in the following solution 
8  2|}1   ~+ 2,11|}1  YZ  .       (35) 
Thus, together with the restriction  O D the optimal production level in a centrally managed 
supply chain is given by 
F  f8			 			8 O DD				 			8 Q D    .                  (36) 
From (35) it follows that 8 is steadily increasing with increasing product profitability p/c so 
that there exists some critical profitability level ]P for which 8 equals D. This level can be 
directly determined from (35) and is given by 
]P  2,1165|}1   .         (37) 
Thus, if the profitability is sufficiently high, i.e. if  
R Q ]P, the optimal production level 
will always be equal to external demand. In this context it has to be mentioned that under IG
yield the minimal profitability level which guarantees non-negative profits is equal to *R
       The safety stock 99E? can be determined according to (7), resulting in the following closed-
form expression  
99E?   12,1  &* + '6) + D			 			8 O D12,1  * + P + D					 			8 Q D    .                (38) 
This confirms the finding in Property 2 that under IG yield the safety stock always must be 
negative, i.e. 99E? S . From (35) it is easy to see that the optimal production and, thus, the 
safety stock level is increasing with increasing product profitability p/c as long as F S D.
Like for the production quantity, the safety stock will be constant for each profitability level 
which exceeds the critical value ]P.
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Since production always undershoots demand there is no stock on hand 9HI? that is held in 
the supply chain. A next consequence is that the fill rate fr as a service measure can simply be 
expressed by "/ D  #l'%P  12,142,1P    .      (39) 
The highest possible service level is reached for all instances where F equals D or, 
equivalently, when profitability p/c is larger than the critical level ]P. This means that a fill 
rate level "D/ D cannot be exceeded even if the product profitability is arbitrarily high. 
This maximum fill rate is increasing with increasing success parameter  and decreasing with 
increasing demand level D. As consequence, under IG yield the optimal service level can 
become extremely low if the customer demand reaches a very high level. 
 5.2.      Decentralized Supply Chain 
Like in the other yield situations, in a decentralized setting with local optimization the 
producer’s profit function =LLJDM has the same structure as the global one. The only 
difference to the profit in (34) is that the external price p is replaced by the wholesale price w
and that the condition L O DM has to be taken into account.  Thus, as optimal production 
level for a given retailer’s order we get 
LDM  fL8			 			L8 O DMDM				 			L8 Q DM                 (40) 
with L8  2|}1   ~+ 2,11|}1  Yb .        (41) 
The retailer knows that the manufacturer will never produce more than his own order DM and 
that a production level above customer demand D will not affect his probabilities of receiving 
D or less units. Thus, he has no incentive to order more than D units (i.e., DM O D) so that the 
profit function in (10) reduces to
=MDMJL  
 + N  @#L%    with        L O DM  .               (42) 
Due to the regular price relationship N O 
  the retailer’s optimal response is to order as 
much as possible under the restriction DM O D what results in an optimal order quantity of 
DMF  D   .       (43) 
Thus, from the producer-retailer interaction in (40) we finally find as optimal production level 
of the manufacturer 
LF  fL8			 			L8 O DD					 			L8 Q D                  (44) 
Since a comparison of (35) and (41) reveals that L8 O 8, it is obvious from the production 
levels in (36) and (44) that always LF O F holds. This means that also under IG yield the 
production level and hence the supply chain safety stock is smaller in a decentralized setting 
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than under central decision making, except for N  
 where the results are identical. As 
consequence, also in a decentralized supply chain the safety stock is negative (i.e. 99EP S .),
and because of LF O DMF  D neither the producer nor the retailer will hold any physical 
inventory (GHILP  GHIMP  .).
The properties concerning the impact of product profitability on production level and safety 
stock that were found for the centralized supply chain carry over to the decentralized setting if 
w/c is interpreted as profitability measure instead of p/c. Here, the lower bound on w/c is 
determined from the respective zero profit condition like in the centralized case at a 
production level of L8 instead of 8. Thus, different from the situation under SP and BI
yield, with increasing wholesale price w in its feasible range R O N O 
 the course of 
production and safety stock does not have a U-shape, but is characterized by a steady increase 
in the IG yield case until a maximum is reached when w/c exceeds the critical profitability ]P	in (37). Furthermore, also under decentralization of decision making the fill rate fr can be 
calculated like in (39) with LF  as production level Q. So the minimum service level is given 
for minimum product profitability *R, and the maximum level holds for all cases with NR Q ]P.
These general results are illustrated by a numerical example where except for the yield 
parameter the same data are chosen like for the SP and BI yield examples. In order to report 
reasonable numerical results a high success probability of   .: is chosen for the IG
example. The respective results (including fill rate data) for this example are presented in 
Table 3 and confirm that the safety stocks always stay in the minus region resulting in fill 
rates that range between 24 % for w=2 and 43 % as highest level that is reached for NR K]P  . Even for the highest feasible wholesale price value this upper level will not be 
exceeded. The minimum wholesale price level that guarantees non-negative profits is 
somewhat lower than w=2 and can be calculated to be w=1/0.98=1.02.
 w 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14
IG QP 34 54 68 79 88 96 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Yield DR 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
=0.98 SST 76 67 63 61 59 58 57 57 57 57 57 57 57
 fr(in%) 24 33 37 39 41 42 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Table 3: Decisions and stocks in a decentralized supply chain for IG yield 
The safety stock analysis for situations with IG yield raises some critical questions concerning
the relevance of the modelled decision problem. The general negativity of safety stock values 
and especially the continuously decreasing service level for increasing demand, even for 
extremely high product profitability, make it doubtful that one would face such a decision 
context widely in practice. In the above example with a demand of D=100 it needs a success 
probability of   . to guarantee a fill rate of 95%. So, under both centralized and 
decentralized supply chain conditions the solution of the modelled optimization problem will 
only lead to acceptable solutions if a very high process quality is existing and/or if demand 
has only a fairly low level. Under other planning conditions in case of IG yield the production 
process should be organized in such a way that more than a single production run per period 
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can be carried out to satisfy the period’s demand. This facilitates the execution of smaller 
production batches with lower risk of large yield losses and helps to guarantee arbitrarily high 
service levels in cases of high product profitability. An overview of approaches that optimize 
the number and batch size of production runs for a given fixed cost per run is found in 
Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak (2004).
6. Insights and Future Research 
There is a bunch of findings that emerge from the above analysis of yield randomness and its 
impact on safety stock holding in supply chains under both central and local planning 
conditions. A first major insight is that it is not only the degree of yield risk but, even more 
importantly, the type of yield randomness that matters.  
In general, in a centralized setting the safety stock size increases steadily with an increasing 
profit margin of the product. For IG yield, however, this increase is strictly limited because 
here production never exceeds demand so that the safety stock will never take on a positive 
value. Thus, under IG yield the service level might remain at a very low size even if the 
product profitability is extremely high. With SP and BI yield negative safety stock will only 
occur if the profit margin is relatively low. The safety inventory will always be positive if a 
critical profitability level is exceeded. Furthermore, the impact of demand is even more 
diverse for the different yield types. With increasing demand level the safety stock in 
continuously increasing or, in case of negative value, decreasing under SP yield while this 
stock tends to approach zero under BI yield. In the case of IG yield the safety stock will only 
change with increasing demand if the product profitability is sufficiently high.
In a decentralized setting the supply chain safety stock is directly determined by the 
manufacturer’s production decision. Under all yield types this stock is lower than the 
respective safety level under central decision making as long as price and cost parameters are 
such that both supply chain members make positive profits. This is a consequence of the 
double marginalization effect that is also well-known from other supply chain problem areas 
if a simple wholesale price contract is applied. Although the manufacturer’s production 
problem has the same structure as the decision problem of the central supply chain planner, 
the general safety stock properties from the centralized setting do not simply carry over. This 
is because the manufacturer’s response to the retailer’s order is anticipated and causes a 
retailer’s reaction that results in an order size that might exceed the external supply chain 
demand. One faces such a situation if from retailer’s view the product profitability is 
relatively high. This effect is never found under IG yield, but it exists in case of SP and BI
yield so that under these yield types an increase of the manufacturer’s product margin (in 
terms of the ratio of wholesale price and unit production cost) will not necessarily lead to an 
increase of production and safety stock level, but can even result in a decrease. Interestingly, 
the distribution of safety stock dependent stock on hand between the supply chain members 
differs considerably according to the relative product profitability which depends on the 
wholesale price level. While the stock on hand concentrates on the retailer side for a low 
manufacturer’s and high retailer’s margin the opposite holds if the margin relationship is the 
other way around.
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Further research is necessary in order to reveal to which extent the above insights carry over 
to more complex supply chain structures like those with several stages and multiple producers 
and retailers. The same holds for the investigation of situations where yield risks come along 
with demand uncertainty. Up to now, studies that address these cases like those by Gurnani 
and Gerchak (2007) and by Güler and Bilgic (2009), for example, only refer to problems with 
SP yield and need to be extended to the other yield types. An extension of the above research 
to multi-period problems can be based on already existing studies for centralized supply 
chains (see Inderfurth and Vogelgesang 2013), but needs the solution of highly complex 
game-theoretic problems in the case of local supply chain decision making. A very valuable 
extension would lie in the consideration of multiple production runs, particularly in situations 
with IG yield where the safety stock analysis in this paper has only limited practical relevance 
for cases with low process quality and high product margin. For this problem type solutions 
only exist for centrally coordinated supply chains (see Grosfeld-Nir and Gerchak 2004) while 
it is a major challenge to solve these problems in a decentralized setting with producer-retailer 
interaction. Finally, an additional field for future research is given if the current research is 
extended to manufacturer-retailer interactions that base upon more complex contract types 
than the simple wholesale price contract. For many problem areas a large variety of contracts 
has been analyzed which aim to coordinate local supply chain decisions to the optimal central 
solution (see Cachon 2003). From recent research contributions addressing the above random 
yield problem (see Inderfurth and Clemens 2014 and Clemens and Inderfurth 2015) it is 
known that two contract types, namely the so-called overproduction risk sharing and the 
penalty contract, achieve coordination if their parameters are chosen such that the retailer 
always is incentivized to place orders according to the external demand. Under these 
conditions also under decentralized decision making the safety stock is equal to that of the 
centralized solution in case of SP and BI yield. It is not clear, however, if this result also holds 
for other contract types that enable coordination like, for instance, the pay-back-revenue-
sharing contract proposed in Tang and Kouvelis (2014). Furthermore, it is completely 
unknown which types of contracts will support coordination if IG yield is considered and how 
they affect safety stock management in the supply chain.   
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